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Market Rewards to Patterns of Increasing Earnings: Do Cash Flow Patterns, 
Accruals Manipulation and Real Activities Manipulation Matter? 
 
Abstract 
This study explores whether firms have differential price-earnings multiples associated 
with their means of achieving a sequential pattern of increasing positive earnings. Our 
main findings show that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to 
firms when their pattern of increasing earnings is supported by the same pattern of 
increasing cash flows. Market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to 
firms suspect of having engaged in accrual-based earnings management, sales 
manipulation, and overproduction to achieve the earnings pattern. We find, however, 
that market participants do not penalize firms suspect of having achieved the earnings 
pattern through the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses.  
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1. Introduction 
    We empirically examine whether the market prices differently firms with a pattern of 
increasing earnings that at the same time (i) report the same pattern of increasing cash 
flows, (ii) have discretionary accruals that if not included in earnings would break the 
earnings trend, and (iii) alter optimal operational transactions to avoid breaking the 
earnings pattern. Prior studies show that market participants reward firms that meet or 
beat certain earnings benchmarks: prior year earnings (e.g., Barth et al., 1999; Francis 
et al., 2003; Myers et al., 2007; Koonce and Lipe, 2010), and analysts’ forecasts (e.g., 
Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002). The results of prior research on 
whether the market rewards differently firms that manage their accounting numbers to 
meet or beat these targets are mixed. There is evidence showing that price-earnings 
multiples are reduced when a consecutive string of increasing earnings is supported by 
earnings management (Francis et al., 2003), and that abnormal returns do not exist for 
firms that meet or beat earnings forecasts through accruals management and real 
activities management in the UK (Athanasakou et al., 2011). In contrast, some evidence 
shows that the market fails to identify firms meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts 
through earnings management (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2010), and that 
analysts are unable to see through firms that employ earnings management to avoid 
losses and earnings decreases (Burgstahler and Eames, 2003).  
  Given these mixed results we contribute to prior literature analyzing whether firms 
with obvious signals of not having (having) engaged in earnings management to meet 
or beat the benchmarks receive an additional market reward (penalty). We refer to firms 
with obvious signals of not having managed earnings as non-suspect beaters. We define 
non-suspect beaters as those firms with five years of consecutive increases both in 
earnings and in cash flows. We identify two types of suspect firms: (a) firms with five 
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years of consecutive earnings increases that present discretionary accruals that, if not 
included in earnings, would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, and (b) 
firms with five years of consecutive earnings increases that engage in inefficient 
operational practices with the objective of managing earnings, and that would have 
broken the pattern of increasing earnings in the absence of those inefficient operational 
practices. We expect suspect firms to be penalized by the market. 
Using a sample of 22,605 US listed non-financial, non-utility, and profit-making 
firm-year observations for the period 1995-2007, obtained from COMPUSTAT, our 
findings are consistent with Barth et al. (1999) that firms with a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms. Our 
empirical analysis also generates the following major findings. First, market 
participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters. Second, 
market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to suspect firms that use 
accrual-based earnings management to achieve a five-year pattern of increasing 
earnings. Third, the price-earnings multiples are reduced when the earnings pattern is 
achieved through sales manipulation, that is, through increasing sales on credit beyond 
whatever is advisable by common practice. In addition, market participants assign 
lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspect of having increased production more 
than necessary. However, the market fails to reduce rewards to firms suspect of 
producing the earnings pattern through reductions in discretionary expenses, such as 
R&D expenses, and selling, general, administrative and advertising expenses.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a discussion 
of the related literature and describes the hypotheses. Section 3 contains the research 
design. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical results. Section 5 reports 
robustness tests. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Prior Research and Development of the Hypotheses 
Recent research provides evidence that market participants reward firms that meet or 
beat certain earnings benchmarks, such as prior year earnings (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; 
Francis et al., 2003; Myers et al., 2007; Koonce and Lipe, 2010), and analysts’ forecasts 
(e.g., Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). 
Regarding earnings increases, prior research shows that benchmark beating firms enjoy 
higher price-earnings multiples (Barth et al. 1999, Francis et al., 2003) and positive 
abnormal returns (Myers et al., 2007). Koonce and Lipe (2010) conduct several 
experiments to investigate how and why investors react to patterns of increasing 
earnings and conclude that investors assign higher stock price to these firms because 
they consider a pattern of earnings increases as a signal of higher management’s 
credibility and better future prospects. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the 
results in the survey study in Graham et al. (2005) that managers seek to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks to build credibility and to inform about future growth prospects.  
Among the firms that report a pattern of consecutive increases in earnings, some may 
achieve the pattern through intrinsic performance, while others may engage in different 
forms of earnings management to achieve the benchmark and mislead investors 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). Given that cash flows are more 
difficult and more costly to manage than accruals, we use them to assess whether the 
pattern of increasing earnings is genuine. We argue that a firm with a pattern of 
increasing earnings is non-suspect of having engaged in earnings management 
whenever the earnings pattern comes together with a pattern of increasing cash flows. 
If financial analysts use this simple signal to identify non-suspect beaters, we argue that 
these non-suspect beaters (with patterns of consecutive increases both in earnings and 
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in cash flows) will enjoy higher price-earnings multiples than firms with only a pattern 
of increasing earnings. This leads to the first hypothesis in the paper:  
H1: Investors assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms with a pattern of 
increasing earnings that is supported by the same pattern of increasing cash 
flows. 
 
Our second set of hypotheses refers to whether market participants price differently 
benchmark beating firms suspect of meeting or beating the target through the 
management of accruals and/or the management of real operational activities. A large 
number of studies starting with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al. (1999) 
and Kasznik (1999) show that managers engage in earnings management to meet or 
beat several earnings thresholds, including zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and 
analysts’ and managerial earnings forecasts.  
Earnings management can be achieved through accounting choices and estimates 
about accruals, and/or through altering reported earnings by adjusting the timing and 
the scale of underlying real business activities to mislead market participants. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) conclude that firms manage working capital accruals to 
avoid reporting negative earnings, and Kasznik (1999) shows that when managers make 
optimistic disclosures about future earnings there are significant levels of positive 
discretionary accruals because managers use accruals opportunistically to achieve their 
own earnings forecasts. Regarding the manipulation of real operational activities to 
meet financial reporting goals, Roychowdhury (2006) finds empirical evidence that 
firms avoid reporting losses through temporal sales increases, overproduction, and the 
opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses, such as R&D investment, selling, 
general and administrative (SGA) expenses and advertising expenses. The survey study 
conducted by Graham et al. (2005) shows that the majority of managers employ real 
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activities management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks even though real activities 
management decreases future cash flows and firm value (Roychowdhury, 2006). Finally, 
Myers et al. (2007) argue that the frequency of firms reporting patterns of increasing 
earnings is much larger than it would be expected, and they interpret this preliminary 
evidence as consistent with earnings management to achieve the patterns. They further 
show that firms reporting patterns of increasing earnings are more likely to maintain or 
extend the patterns through various means of earnings management, including reporting 
more positive or negative special items, increasing stock repurchases and adjusting 
effective tax rates. 
Although there is plenty of evidence showing that firms manage earnings to achieve 
earnings benchmarks, it is not clear whether market participants penalize benchmark 
beating firms that meet the benchmarks through earnings management. Francis et al. 
(2003) show that price-earnings multiples are reduced or are even eliminated when the 
pattern of meeting last year’s earnings is supported by low quality earnings, suggesting 
that the market is aware of earnings that are managed. Athanasakou et al. (2011) show 
that the market does not reward UK firms meeting or beating earnings forecasts through 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities management, concluding that 
the market provides no incentives for managers to achieve earnings expectations 
through earnings management. In contrast with this evidence, other studies show that 
market participants do not penalize firms that meet or beat certain earnings benchmarks 
through earnings management. Burgstahler and Eames (2003) demonstrate that analysts 
are unable to consistently see through firms that have engaged in earnings management 
to avoid earnings decreases, and Bartov et al. (2002) show that the returns to firms that 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts are only marginally affected depending on whether 
earnings are managed. Finally, Chen et al. (2010) find that market participants reward 
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firms meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts at the earnings announcement date no 
matter if accruals or real activities are managed to achieve analysts’ forecasts.  
We contribute to this stream of literature analyzing whether firms with signals of 
having engaged in earnings management to meet or beat the benchmarks are penalized 
by market participants. We predict that price-earnings multiples are lower for firms 
achieving a pattern of increasing earnings either through accrual-based earnings 
management and/or through real activities management. This leads to our second set of 
hypotheses: 
H2 (a): Investors reduce price-earnings multiples to firms achieving a 
pattern of increasing earnings through the opportunistic use of accruals.  
H2 (b): Investors reduce price-earnings multiples to firms achieving a 
pattern of increasing earnings through real activities management, including 
accelerating sales on credit beyond whatever is advisable by common 
practice, overproduction and opportunistically reducing discretionary 
expenses. 
  
3. Research Design  
In our empirical tests, we choose a five-year pattern of increasing earnings as a cutoff 
based on the results in Barth et al. (1999) and the basic results do not change when we 
use different lengths of patterns in earnings increases.   
3.1 Estimation model 
We conduct our analysis by estimating the following regression: 
ܴܲܫܥܧ௜,௧ ൌ 	 		ߚ଴ ൅ 	ߚଵ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߚଶ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚଷ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦܥܨܱ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚସ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦ_ܣܯ_ܣܥܥܴ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚହ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦ_ܴܯ_ܵܣܮܧ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚ଺	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦ_ܴܯ_ܴܱܲܦ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚ଻	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦ_ܴܯ_ܦܫܺܲ5௜,௧	
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																					൅	ߚ଼	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄5,௜,௧ ൅ ߚଽ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚଵ଴	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܧݒܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଵଵ	ܤܸ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	        (1) 
Where i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. PRICE is share price at the fiscal year 
end (COMPUSTAT #199). EPS is income before extraordinary items, NIBE 
(COMPUSTAT #18), divided by number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS, 
(COMPUSTAT #54).  
Throughout our tests and to identify firms that report a pattern of increasing earnings, 
we focus on income before extraordinary items, NIBE. Equation (1) includes an 
indicator variable DBEAT5୧୲  that takes value 1 if firm i  continuously reports 
increasing positive earnings for five years, and 0 otherwise. We expect that βଶ  is 
positive, indicating that firms with a five-year pattern of increasing positive earnings 
have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms (Barth et al., 1999).  
We refer to firms with a five-year pattern both in earnings increases and cash flows 
increases as non-suspect beaters. We create an indicator variable DCFO5୧୲  that 
captures whether a firm reports a pattern of increasing cash flows, regardless of whether 
the pattern of increasing cash flows is linked to a pattern of increasing in earnings. We 
identify non-suspect beaters using an interaction term DBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DCFO5୧୲ taking the 
value of 1 if firm i reports five-year patterns of increases in positive increasing earnings 
and in positive increasing cash flows, and 0 otherwise. Regarding whether there are 
additional rewards to non-suspect beaters, we expect coefficient βଷ  to be positive, 
implying that non-suspect beaters ሺDBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DCFO5୧୲ ൌ 1ሻ  enjoy higher price-
earnings multiples than the rest of firms with a pattern of increasing earnings 
ሺDBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DCFO5୧୲ ൌ 0ሻ. 
For the test of market rewards to firms suspect of having engaged in earnings 
management to achieve the earnings pattern, we expect that market participants assign 
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lower price-earnings multiples to suspect firms. The indicator variable D_AM_ACCR5୧,୲ 
captures whether firms would fail to achieve the pattern of increasing earnings if 
discretionary accruals are not included in earnings. The interaction term DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗
D_AM_ACCR5୧,୲ captures whether earnings beaters (firms with a five-year pattern of 
consecutive earnings increases) would fail to achieve the pattern of increasing earnings 
if discretionary accruals were not included in earnings. We expect that suspect firms 
(DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_AM_ACCR5୧,୲ ൌ 1) are penalized by market participants, leading to 
lower price-earnings multiples. If that is the case, we expect coefficient βସ  to be 
negative. D_RM_SALE5୧,୲ is an indicator variable indicating whether firms would fail 
to achieve the pattern of increasing earnings if the effect of sales manipulation were not 
included in earnings. The interaction term DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_RM_SALE5୧,୲  captures 
whether earnings beaters would fail to achieve the pattern of increasing earnings if the 
effect of sales manipulation were not included in earnings. We expect coefficient βହ 
to be negative, implying those suspect firms ሺDBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_RM_SALE5୧,୲ ൌ 1ሻ are 
penalized by market participants. We use an indicator variable D_RM_PROD5୧,୲  to 
capture whether firms would fail to sustain a five-year pattern of increasing earnings if 
the effect of overproduction were not included in earnings. The interaction term 
DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_RM_PROD5୧,୲ captures whether earnings beaters would fail to achieve 
the earnings pattern when the influence of overproduction were not included in earnings. 
We expect that coefficient β଺ is negative, implying that market participants reduce 
price-earnings multiples to those suspect firm. Finally, the indicator variable 
D_RM_DIXP5୧,୲  captures whether firms would fail to report a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings if the effect of the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses 
were not included in earnings. The interaction term DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_RM_DIXP5୧,୲ 
captures whether earnings beaters would fail to achieve the earnings pattern if the 
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opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses were not included in earnings. We 
expect coefficient β଻ to be negative, indicating that market participants reduce price-
earnings multiples to firms suspect of having engaged in discretionary expenses 
management.  
Finally, following Barth et al. (1999) we add four controls: Growth5, Leverage, Evar 
and BVS. Growth5 is the five-year compound growth rate of book value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT #60). We predict β଼ to be positive. Leverage is defined as the sum of 
short-term debt due within one year and long-term debt, divided by market value of 
equity (COMPUSTAT #34 + COMPUSTAT #9) /(COMPUSTAT #199 * COMPUSTAT 
#25). Evar is measured as the variance of the past five years’ percentage change in 
earnings ሺNIBE୧,୲ െ NIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ/absሺNIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ. Leverage is a measure of financial 
risk and Evar is a measure of operating risk. We expect βଽ and βଵ଴ to be negative. 
BVS is book value of equity per share. Following Ohlson (1995) and Barth et al. (1999), 
we expect coefficient βଵଵ to be positive.   
3.2 Identifying suspect firms 
We refer to firms with signals of having engaged in accrual-based earnings 
management or real activities management to sustain five years of consecutive earnings 
increases as suspect firms. We consider suspect firms those with (a) five years of 
consecutive earnings increases that present discretionary accruals that, if not included 
in earnings, would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, or (b) five years of 
consecutive earnings increases that engage in inefficient operational practices with the 
objective of managing earnings, and that would have broken the pattern of increasing 
earnings in the absence of those inefficient operational practices. 
3.2.1 Identification of firms suspect of accrual-based earnings management 
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We use an indicator variable 	D_AM_ACCR5୧,୲  taking the value of 1 if firm i’s 
earnings without discretionary accruals are less than previous year’s actual earnings 
during any of the five years, and 0 otherwise. We define an interaction term	DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗
D_AM_ACCR5୧,୲ that takes value 1 if earnings beaters (firms with a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings) would fail to report the earnings pattern in the absence of 
discretionary accruals in the reported earnings, and 0 otherwise. We obtain earnings 
without discretionary accruals by subtracting the abnormal accruals from the reported 
earnings, in which abnormal accruals are the difference between actual accruals and 
fitted normal accruals estimated using the Jones (1991) model.  
The Jones (1991) model we use to estimate the normal level of accruals is as follows: 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧		                  (2) 
where TAi,t (Total accruals) is measured as income before extraordinary items, NIBE, 
minus cash flows from operations, CFO, (COMPUSTAT #18 – #308). The variable 
∆SALE୧,୲ is the change in sales revenues and PPE୧,୲ is firm’s gross property, plant, and 
equipment (COMPUSTAT #7). All variables are scaled by lagged total assets, Ai,t-1 
(COMPUSTAT #6). A higher value of abnormal total accruals implies that managers 
are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management.  
3.2.2 Identification of firms suspect of real earnings management 
Firms suspect of having engaged in real activities management to achieve a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings are those firms that undertake inefficient operating 
practices with the objective of avoiding breaking the pattern of increasing earnings. 
Following prior studies by Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006), we 
consider three strategies of real activities management: accelerating sales on credit 
beyond whatever is advisable by common practice, producing more goods than 
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necessary and the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses.  
Sales manipulation 
We create an indicator variable D_RM_SALE5୧,୲ that takes value of 1 if  firm i’s 
earnings without the influence of sales management are less than previous year’s actual 
earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. We use an interaction 
indicator DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_RM_SALE5୧,୲  taking value 1 if earnings beaters fail to 
maintain a five-year pattern of increasing earnings when the inefficient sales 
manipulation is not included in the calculation of earnings, and 0 otherwise. We 
generate earnings without the effect of sales manipulation by adding abnormal CFO to 
the reported earnings. The abnormal CFO is actual CFO minus the CFO that one would 
expect given sales. 
Following Dechow et al. (1998), Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Bartov 
and Cohen (2009) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we express normal CFO from sales 
as a linear function of sales and the change in sales. Firms can accelerate sales to 
increase current earnings by offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms. The 
increased sales as a result of the price discounts and lenient credit terms are likely to 
disappear once the prices revert to the old ones. Such sales manipulation leads to higher 
current earnings when the sales are booked and margins are positive, however, it leads 
to lower current CFO given the normal sales levels (Roychowdhury, 2006). To estimate 
normal CFO, we run the following cross-sectional regression for each industry-year: 
஼ிை೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                  (3) 
where CFO୧,୲ is cash flows from operation (COMPUSTAT #308). A more negative 
value of abnormal CFO implies that managers are more likely to engage in sales 
manipulation to increase earnings.  
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Overproduction  
We construct an indicator variable D_RM_PROD5୧,୲ that equals 1 if firm i’s earnings 
without the effect of overproduction are less than previous year’s actual earnings during 
any of the five years, and 0 otherwise. We create an interaction term DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗
D_RM_PROD5୧,୲  taking value of 1 if earnings beaters break a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings when the effect of overproduction is not included in earnings, and 
0 otherwise.  
Overproduction takes place when managers produce more goods than needed to 
report lower cost of goods sold (COGS) and therefore to increase current earnings. To 
capture and quantify overproduction, we estimate normal production costs using the 
following regression (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Gunny 2010; Zang, 2012):	
௉ோை஽೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙସ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟షభ
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧   (4) 
where PRODi,t is production costs defined as the sum of COGSi,t (COMPUSTAT #44) 
and change in inventory (COMPUSTAT #3) during the year. The abnormal production 
costs are the difference between actual production costs and normal production costs. 
A higher value of abnormal production costs implies that managers are more likely to 
overproduce to increase earnings. We subtract abnormal production costs from earnings 
to obtain earnings without the effect of overproduction. 
Discretionary expenses management (opportunistic decreases in discretionary 
expenses) 
An indicator variable D_RM_DIXP5୧,୲  equals 1 if firm i’s earnings without the 
influence of opportunistic decreases in discretionary expenses are less than previous 
year’s actual earnings during any of the five years, and 0 otherwise. We create an 
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interaction term DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ D_RM_DIXP5୧,୲  that takes value 1 if earnings beaters 
break a five-year pattern of increasing earnings when the effect of discretionary 
expenses management is not included in earnings, and 0 otherwise.  
Discretionary expenses are generally expensed in the period when they are incurred; 
however, firms can opportunistically reduce current discretionary expenses to inflate 
current earnings. We estimate normal levels of discretionary expenses using the 
following model (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010): 
஽ூ௑௉೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟షభ
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                            (5) 
where DIXPi,t is discretionary expenses, including R&D (COMPUSTAT #46), selling, 
general and administrative expenses (COMPUSTAT #189) and advertising expenses 
(COMPUSTAT #45). The abnormal discretionary expenses are the difference between 
actual discretionary expenses and normal discretionary expenses estimated with 
equation (5). We calculate earnings without the effect of discretionary expenses 
management by adding abnormal discretionary expenses to the reported earnings. 
   
4. Sample, Descriptive Statistics and Results 
4.1 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of all available firms on the annual industrial and research 
COMPUSTAT North America databases between 1990 and 2007, excluding regulated 
firms (SIC codes between 4400 and 4999), and banks and financial institutions (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999). We require at least fifteen observations for each 
industry-year to perform cross-sectional regressions to estimate normal levels of 
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accruals and operational activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). We drop 
observations with missing data of income before extraordinary items and/or number of 
common shares outstanding are missing. A few observations of EPS take on extreme 
values, so we eliminate the upper and lower 1% of the EPS for each year (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997). This finally yields a sample of 83,443 firm-year observations from 
1990 to 2007. This is the starting data set we use to estimate normal levels of total 
accruals in equation (2), and normal levels of the three types of real activities in 
equations (3), (4) and (5).1 We employ, though, restricted subsets in our main tests. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents the number of firms with different patterns of increasing positive 
earnings and cash flows from 1990 to 2007. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 show the 
number of firms reporting different patterns of increasing positive earnings and 
different patterns of increasing positive cash flows. The number of firms with earnings 
patterns and cash flow patterns decreases with the length of patterns. More firms report 
a one-year pattern of increasing cash flows than a one-year pattern of increasing 
earnings. However, there are more firms reporting consecutive earnings increases than 
cash flow increases from a two-year pattern to a twelve-year pattern. Besides, the 
number of firms reporting cash flow patterns decreases more rapidly with the length of 
patterns than the number of firms reporting earnings patterns. This is preliminary 
evidence that firms mainly use earnings, but not cash flows, to signal to the market that 
their business follows a stable growth trend. This is in line with a survey study 
conducted by Graham et al. (2005, p.49), showing that Chief Financial Officers think 
earnings volatility matters more than cash flow volatility because “the market becomes 
                                                      
1 We estimate normal levels of total accruals and operating activities cross-sectionally with at least 
fifteen observations for each two-digit SIC industry-year between 1990 and 2007. 
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more skeptical of underlying cash flows when earnings are volatile.” Executives believe 
that a firm is perceived as riskier by the market when it has more volatile earnings than 
another firm even if these two firms have the same cash flow volatility (Graham et al., 
2005). This evidence is also in line with managers using additional tools such as 
accruals and/or operational activities to sustain their consecutive increases in earnings. 
Column 4 presents the number of firms that have the same patterns of increasing 
positive earnings and increasing positive cash flows. The number decays at a rate higher 
than 50% with the length of patterns. 
To carry out our tests on whether market participants reward differently firms in line 
with their means of achieving a five-year pattern of increasing earnings, we first 
constrain the sample to firms with at least five years of earnings history and 39,275 
profit- and loss-making firm-year observations remain. We require profit-making firms 
for our estimation sample, and this criterion eliminates 14,129 observations of negative 
earnings, yielding 25,146 observations. We further require an identical sample 
throughout all our tests to avoid empirical results varying across estimation models, and 
this requirement eliminates 2,541 observations, which yields our final sample of 22,605 
profit-making firm-year observations between 1995 and 2007. We use this sample for 
testing all of our hypotheses. Table 1 also shows that out of the 2,088 earnings beaters 
(firms with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings), 18% (368) are non-suspect 
beaters (firms with five-year patterns of increasing earnings increases and increasing 
cash flows).  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics based on the sample for which we report 
regression results. Table 2 also presents means for earnings beaters (firms with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings) and non-earnings beaters (firms without a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings) separately, and t-tests for differences in means across the 
two subsamples. Specifically, earnings beaters have significantly higher share price, 
earnings, EPS and CFO than non-earnings beaters. Non-earnings beaters have 
significantly lower sales, total assets, market capitalization and ratio of market value of 
equity to book value of equity than earnings beaters.  
Total accruals scaled by lagged total assets (TA/A) are similar for earnings beaters 
and for non-earnings beaters and not significantly different. CFO scaled by lagged total 
assets (CFO/A) is 0.16 for earnings beaters versus 0.12 for non-earnings beaters, and 
the difference is significant. The value of production costs scaled by lagged total assets 
(PROD/A) is 1.15 for the earnings beaters and it is significantly higher than scaled 
production costs for non-earnings beaters (0.99). The scaled discretionary expenses 
(DIXP/A) are not significantly different across the two subsamples. In addition, 
earnings beaters have significant higher growth in book value of equity (Growth5) and 
lower financial risk (Leverage) than non-earnings beaters.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations between various variables. Share price (PRICE) 
exhibits strong positive correlation with earnings, EPS, CFO, scaled CFO, abnormal 
CFO (Ab_CFO/A), Growth5 and BVS, and significantly negative correlation with 
scaled production costs, scaled discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs 
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(Ab_PROD/A) and Leverage. Consistent with prior studies, earnings are positively 
correlated with CFO (0.93) and scaled CFO (0.03), and negatively correlated with 
scaled production costs, scaled discretionary expenses and Leverage. EPS is negatively 
correlated with abnormal production costs. As expected, the scaled CFO and scaled 
total accruals exhibit a strong negative correlation, with a correlation coefficient of -
0.96.  
The correlation between abnormal accruals (Ab_TA/A) and abnormal CFO is 
significantly negative (-0.11). This is probably because accrual-based earnings 
management and sales manipulation take place simultaneously (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Zang, 2012). The correlation coefficient between abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DIXP/A) is significantly negative (-0.33). This 
is, probably, because managers engage in overproduction, leading to abnormally high 
production costs; meanwhile, they reduce discretionary expenses when the common 
goal is to report higher earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4.3 Empirical results 
We estimate equation (1) using standard errors clustered by firm and year to control 
for serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence (Petersen, 2009) for 22,605 profit-
making firm-year observations from 1995 to 2007.2 We include year and industry 
                                                      
2 We also estimate equation (1) using White (1980) standard errors. Results are very similar. The t-
statistics are greater if we use White (1980) standard errors rather than Petersen (2009) standard errors, 
but inferences do not change.  
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dummies to control for fixed effects.  
Table 4 reports the regression-based tests of hypothesis H1 regarding whether 
investors assign higher price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters (firms with five-
year patterns both in earnings increases and cash flow increases). The first Column 
shows baseline results of basic price-earnings multiples and other factors that theory 
suggests and prior empirical work has shown to have significant effects on share price. 
The results are consistent with our predictions regarding significantly positive 
coefficients on growth of book value of equity (EPS ∗ Growth5) (4.993, t = 2.88) and 
on book value of equity per share (BVS) (1.258, t = 3.60) and significantly negative 
coefficients on earnings variability (EPS ∗ Evar) (0, t = -1.80) and on leverage ratio 
(EPS ∗ Leverage) (-2.481, -5.98). Column 2 shows that the coefficient on the test 
variable EPS ∗ DBEAT5  is significantly positive (2.940, t = 4.51), consistent with 
Barth et al. (1999) that firms with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings have higher 
price-earnings multiples than other firms.3 In Column 3 the price-earnings multiple of 
DBEAT5 is 2.398 (t = 3.86) and the price-earnings multiple of the interaction term 
DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5 is 3.696 (t = 2.74), indicating that market participants add additional 
rewards to non-suspect beaters, consistent with our hypothesis H1.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table 5 shows regression results of whether investors assign lower price-earnings 
multiples to firms that engage in several earnings management types to achieve earnings 
                                                      
3 Although a five-year pattern is an arbitrary choice, untabulated tests show that market participants also 
assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms that have consecutive patterns of earnings increases from 
two years through eleven years.  
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patterns. Column 1 in Panel A shows that the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5  is 
significantly positive (3.483, t = 4.70), meaning that market participants assign higher 
price-earnings multiple to earnings beaters. The coefficient on 	EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
D_AM_ACCR5  is significantly negative (-2.203, t = -2.85), indicating that market 
participants assign lower price-earnings ratios to suspect firms that fail to maintain five 
years of consecutive increases in earnings if discretionary total accruals are not included 
in earnings, which is consistent with hypothesis H2 (a).4 Column 2 shows that the 
coefficients on earnings beaters is 3.551 (t = 4.59) and that the interaction term EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ D_RM_SALE5 is significantly negative (-3.821, t = -3.46), meaning that 
market participants penalize suspect firms that would have broken the pattern of 
increasing earnings if the effect of sales manipulation on earnings was not considered, 
consistent with hypothesis H2 (b). Column 3 shows that market participants reward 
earnings beaters (3.418, t = 4.40) and the coefficient on the interaction term EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ D_RM_PROD5 is significantly negative (-1.584, t = 2.12), consistent with 
our hypothesis H2 (b) that firms that overproduce to avoid breaking the earnings trend 
have lower price-earnings multiples than the rest of benchmark beating firms. In 
Column 4 the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗ D_RM_DIXP5 is insignificant (-0.325, t 
= -0.33), implying that market participants do not penalize firms that opportunistically 
reduce discretionary expenses to achieve the earnings pattern, which is inconsistent 
with our hypothesis H2 (b).  
Given that accrual-based earnings management and real activities earnings 
management probably take place at the same time (Barton, 2001; Zang, 2012), we 
estimate equation (1) including all earnings management proxies at the same time. 
                                                      
4 This result also holds if we use discretionary working capital accruals. 
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Table 5 Panel B presents regression results of whether market participants assign lower 
price-earnings multiples to suspect firms that have used both accrual-based earnings 
management and each type of real activities management to increase earnings 
simultaneously. Column 1 in Panel B shows that earnings beaters are rewarded (4.092, 
t = 4.62) and that market participants reduce price-earnings multiples to suspect firms 
that have managed total accruals (-2.197, t = -2.69) and sales (-3.816, t = -3.47) to 
increase earnings. Column 2 shows that market participants reward earnings beaters 
(3.864, t = 4.56) and reduce price-earnings multiples to suspect firms that use accrual-
based earnings management (-2.050, t = -2.68) together with overproduction (-1.385, t 
= -1.82). Column 3 shows that price-earnings multiples are lower for suspect firms that 
employ accrual-based earnings management (-2.214, t = -3.08) but not for firms with 
opportunistic decreases in discretionary expenses (0.048, t = 0.05). Finally, Column 4 
shows that market participants do not reduce rewards to firms suspect of overproduction 
(-1.008, t = -1.48) when we consider all types of earnings management. This result 
could be explained by the overlapping classification of different types of suspect firms.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
We carry out an additional test to check whether the results in Table 5 Panel A do not 
vary when the proxy for non-suspect beaters is also included in the models. Table 6 
contains regression results of market rewards on earnings beaters, non-suspect beaters 
and each type of suspect firms. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5  is 3.567 (t = 2.61) and the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
D_AM_ACCR5 is -2.050 (t = -2.66), implying that market participants assign higher 
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price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters and lower price-earnings multiples to 
suspect firms that manage accruals. Column 2 reports that the coefficient on EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5  is 3.114 (t = 2.44) and the coefficient on 	EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
D_RM_SALE5 is -3.298 (t = -3.16), indicating that market participants assign additional 
price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters and reduces price-earnings multiples to 
suspect firms that use sales manipulation to report a pattern of increasing earnings. 
Column 3 shows that market participants assign higher rewards to non-suspect beaters 
(3.570, t = 2.66) and penalize suspect firms that overproduce to avoid breaking the 
earnings pattern (-1.389, t = -1.83). Column 4 shows that the coefficient on EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5   is 3.728 (t = 2.73) and the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
D_RM_DIXP5 is insignificant (-1.389, t = -1.83), indicating that market participants do 
not penalize suspect firms that reduce discretionary expenses opportunistically to avoid 
breaking the earnings trend. The regression results in Table 6 are consistent with the 
preceding findings in Tables 4 and 5 that market participants assign higher price-
earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters and lower price-earnings multiples to suspect 
firms that would have broken a five-year pattern of increasing earnings if discretionary 
accruals, the effects of sales manipulation or the effects of overproduction were not 
included in the reported earnings.5 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
                                                      
5 We repeat the analysis excluding BVS. Our main inferences do not change. 
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5.1 Earnings increases not sustained by sales growth  
Ghosh et al. (2005) show that firms reporting consecutive earnings increases together 
with sales growth have higher price-earnings multiples than firms reporting earnings 
increases alone. Given that sales are more difficult to manipulate than expenses 
(Ertimur et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2005), and continuous earnings increases supported 
by sales growth are perceived as higher earnings quality by the market (Ghosh et al., 
2005), we use sales growth as a signal to gauge whether the pattern of increasing 
earnings has been fabricated. In particular, we consider firms that report earnings 
increases but that do not report increases in sales as suspect firms. We expect that 
market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to these suspect firms.  
To carry out our tests, we create an indicator variable D_NONREV5௜,௧ taking the 
value of 1 if firm i does not report increasing sales revenues for five years, and 0 
otherwise. We define an interaction term DBEAT5௜,௧ ∗ D_NONREV5௜,௧ that takes value 
1 if firm i reports a five-year pattern of earnings increases but not a five-year pattern of 
increasing sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 7 Panel A shows that of the 2,088 earnings beaters (firms with a five-year 
pattern of earnings increases), 19% (398) do not report a five-year pattern of sales 
growth. We view this group of earnings beaters as suspect firms that might have used 
earnings management to maintain the earnings pattern. Panel B shows that the 
coefficient on EPS௜,௧ ∗ DBEAT5௜,௧ is significantly positive (3.530, t = 4.73), and the 
coefficient on EPS௜,௧ ∗ DBEAT5௜,௧ ∗ D_NONREV5௜,௧ is significantly negative (-2.70, t 
= -3.80), meaning that market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to 
suspect firms when their pattern of increasing earnings is not achieved through sales 
growth. 
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[Insert Table 7] 
 
5.2 Additional analyses  
To verify the robustness of our main findings, we repeat the tests of hypotheses H1, 
H2 (a) and H2 (b) using (1) a sample of 39,275 profit- and loss-making firm-year 
observations, and (2) a sample of 2,088 firms with a pattern of five-year earnings 
increases.  
The results with the sample of 39,275 profit- and loss- making firm-year observations 
(EPS൒0 and EPS<0) are not qualitatively different from our main results. Following 
Francis et al. (2003), we control for the effect of loss-making firm-year observations 
using an indicator variable,	DLOSS୧,୲, taking the value of 1 if firm i’s earnings in year 
t is less than 0, and 0 otherwise. Unreported results show that earnings beaters are 
rewarded throughout all model specifications and non-suspect beaters are valued higher 
than the rest of earnings pattern beating firms. The results also show that market 
participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspect of having used 
accrual-based earnings management, sales manipulation or overproduction to achieve 
a five-year pattern of increasing earnings.  
Second, we repeat the test for hypotheses H1, H2(a) and H2(b) using a sample of 
firms meeting or beating prior year earnings for five years (DBEAT5 ൌ 1), which left 
2,088 firm-year observations. The results are consistent with the evidence previously 
reported in our main tests that non-suspect beaters have higher price-earnings multiples 
and that suspect firms that manage discretionary accruals, sales and production have 
lower price-earnings multiples than the rest of earnings pattern beating firms. 
26 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Prior research (Francis et al., 2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003) provides mixed 
results as to whether market participants can see through managerial attempts at 
fabricating streams of increases in earnings. In this paper we complement the existing 
literature by analyzing whether market participants reward firms with obvious signals 
of not having engaged in earnings management to meet or beat prior year’s earnings. 
As a signal that the earnings stream is genuine we look at whether the firm also reports 
a pattern of increases in cash flows. We classify firms with a stream of increases in both 
earnings and cash flows as Non-suspect firms, and find that market rewards to 
benchmark beating firms are more pronounced for these Non-suspect firms. 
We also analyze whether market participants penalize firms suspect of fabricating the 
earnings stream, either through accrual-based earnings management or through the 
manipulation of real activities. We find that market participants assign lower price-
earnings multiples to firms suspect of using accrual-based earnings management to 
achieve a five-year pattern of increasing earnings. Our results also show that market 
participants penalize firms that increase credit sales beyond whatever is advisable by 
common practice or overproduce to reduce cost of goods sold, to achieve the pattern of 
increasing earning. However, market participants do not penalize firms that achieve the 
earnings pattern through opportunistic reductions in discretionary expenses, including 
R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses. 
While we expected firms that opportunistically reduce discretionary expenses to be 
penalized, our empirical results about the opportunistic reduction of discretionary 
expenses are consistent with those in Bhojraj et al. (2009) that firms that meet analysts’ 
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forecasts through real earnings management are not immediately punished in the market. 
Whether this result can be attributed to the limited attention argument discussed by 
Daniel et al., 2002 and Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, to other market imperfections, or to 
other more rational explanations, is something that we do not tackle in the present study, 
but that should be the object of future research. An alternative explanation for this result 
is that the proxy that we use to capture opportunistic decreases in discretionary expenses 
could be noisy and not used in practice by financial analysts. 
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Table 1 
Number of Firms Reporting Patterns of Positive Earnings Increases, Positive CFO 
increases and Both in Positive Earnings and Positive CFO increases
Num. of 
Years 
Num. of  
Earnings Beaters 
Num. of  
CFO Beaters 
Num. of Non-suspect Beaters  
(% over Earnings Beaters) 
1 21995 22468 12791 (0.58) 
2 11369 9162 4428 (0.39) 
3 6292 4070   1806(0.29) 
4 3601 1973 813 (0.23) 
5 2088 993 368 (0.18) 
6 1246 535 189(0.15) 
7 767 291 105(0.14) 
8 484 157 61(0.13) 
9 313 82 33 (0.11) 
10 203 41 14(0.07) 
11 136 19 3(0.02) 
12 95 9 0(0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). CFO = cash flows from 
operations (Compustat #308). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables  
Full Sample, 1995-2007  
(n = 22,605) 
 Earnings Beaters 
(n = 2,088) 
Non-earnings Beaters
(n = 20,517) 
t-statistic 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Mean (Diff. in Mean) 
PRICE 19.072 14.20 22.56 27.50 18.22 18.05***
Earnings 214.74 19.23 981.01 480.58 187.69 13.05***
EPS 1.04 0.74 1.10 1.46 0.99 18.69***
CFO 368.42 30.94 1622.97 720.10 332.51 10.42***
Total Accruals -153.78 -9.11 793.16 -236.69 -145.31 -5.00***
Sales 3259.81 390.58 12921.84 6582.32 2921.68 12.37***
Total Assets 3440.72 349.77 17648.40 7291.31 3048.86 10.24***
Market Capitalization 4517.63 393.84 19808.96 11384.65 3816.87 16.73***
Market to Book 3.17 2.08 12.94 4.42 3.04 4.65***
TA/A -0.03 -0.04 0.27 -0.03 -0.03 0.44
CFO/A 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.16 0.12 7.62***
PROD/A 1.01 0.80 0.96 1.15 0.99 6.87***
DIXP/A 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.35 1.04
Ab_TA/A 0.08 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.08 -4.27***
Ab_CFO/A 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.12 4.63***
Ab_PROD/A 0.03 -0.06 0.62 -0.03 0.04 -4.94***
Ab_DISEXP/A -0.13 -0.10 0.30 -0.16 -0.13 -4.34***
Leverage 0.39 0.15 1.07 0.17 0.41 -9.83***
Evar 945.35 1.54 32101.12 10.21 1040.52 -1.397
Ggrowth5 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.27 0.16 21.50***
BVS 8.43 6.47 8.85 8.13 8.09 0.20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of observations: 22,605 firm-year observations during 1995-2007. */**/*** indicate Significance at the 10%/5% /1% .  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). EPS 
= net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). CFO = cash flows from 
operations (Compustat #308). Total Accruals = the difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations. 
Sales = net sales (Compustat #12). Total Assets = Compustat #6). Market capitalization = close price per share times the number of common 
shares outstanding (Compustat #25). Market to Book = the market capitalization divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat  
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Table 2 (continued)  
 #60). TA/A = total accruals divided by lagged total assets. CFO/A = cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets. PROD/A = 
Production costs divided by lagged total assets, where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Compustat #41) and the 
change in inventories (Compustat #3). DIXP/A = Discretionary expenses divided by lagged total assets, where discretionary expenses are the 
sum of R&D expenses (Compustat #46), advertising expenses (Compustat #45) and SGA expenses (Compustat #189). Ab_TA/A = the 
discretionary total accruals computed using the Jones Model. Ab_CFO/A = the level of abnormal cash flows from operations computed using 
equation (3). Ab_PROD/A = the level of abnormal production costs computed using equation (4). Ab_DIXP/A = the level of abnormal 
discretionary expenses computed using equation (5). Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat #9) 
divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5= 5-year compound growth rate of 
book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix among Key Variables  
 
 
 
 
 Firm characteristics Abnormal earnings management Controls 
 PRICE Earnings EPS CFO TA/A CFO/A PROD/A DIXP/A Ab_TA/A Ab_CFO/A Ab_PROD/A Ab_DIXP/A Leverage Evar Growth5 
Earnings  0.21** 1      
EPS 0.62** 0.27** 1     
CFO 0.20** 0.93** 0.23** 1     
TA/A -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03** 1     
CFO/A 0.04** 0.03** 0.05** 0.03** -0.96 ** 1     
PROD/A -0.08** -0.06** 0.01 -0.07** 0.03 ** -0.02 1     
DIXP/A -0.08** -0.06** -0.16** -0.08** 0.02 0.04 ** 0.13 1     
Ab_TA/A -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02** -0.27 ** -0.18 ** -0.03 ** 0.05 **     
Ab_CFO/A 0.06** 0.07** -0.02 0.07** -0.13 ** 0.20 ** -0.27 ** 0.07 ** -0.11** 1   
Ab_PROD/A -0.09** -0.06** -0.03** -0.07** 0.02 -0.03 ** 0.71 ** -0.01 0.03** -0.25** 1   
Ab_DIXP/A -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 ** 0.05 ** -0.16 ** 0.48 0.03** -0.26** -0.33** 1   
Leverage -0.10** -0.03** -0.03** 0.01 0.01 -0.06 ** 0.05 ** -0.11 ** -0.01 -0.12** 0.02 -0.00 1   
Evar -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 1   
Growth5 0.10** 0.01 0.03** -0.00 -0.00 0.04 ** -0.02 -0.03 ** -0.01 0.10** -0.09** -0.03** -0.09** 0.11 1 
BVS 0.69** 0.09** 0.60** 0.11** -0.01 -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.20 ** -0.04** -0.09** -0.06** -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05** 
Number of observations: 22,605 firm-year observations during 1995-2007. ** represents the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). CFO = cash flows from operations (Compustat #308). TA/A = total accruals 
divided by lagged total assets. CFO/A = cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets. PROD/A = Production costs divided by lagged total assets, where 
production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Compustat #41) and the change in inventories (Compustat #3). DIXP/A = Discretionary expenses divided by 
lagged total assets, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses (Compustat #46), advertising expenses (Compustat # 45) and SGA expenses (Compustat 
#189). Ab_TA/A = the discretionary total accruals computed using the Jones Model. Ab_CFO/A = the level of abnormal cash flows from operations computed using equation 
(3). Ab_PROD/A = the level of abnormal production costs computed using equation (4), where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Compustat 
#41) and the change in inventories (Compustat #3). Ab_DIXP/A = the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses 
(Compustat #46), advertising expenses (Compustat #45) and SGA expenses (Compustat #189) . Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat # 34) and long-term debt 
(Compustat # 9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value 
of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Market Rewards to Non-suspect Beaters (Firms with Five-year 
Patterns of Increasing Earnings and Increasing Cash Flows)
N=22,605   1 2 3 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.061
(0.99) 
1.057
(0.97) 
1.047
(0.96) 
EPS + 6.228
(3.73)
***
 
5.749
(3.37)
**
 
5.756
(3.37)
**
 
EPS*DBEAT5 +  2.940
(4.51)
***
 
2.398
(3.86)
***
EPS*DBEAT5*DCFO5 +  3.696
(2.74)
**
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.993
(2.88)
***
 
4.792
(2.46)
**
 
4.741
(2.40)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.481
(-5.98)
***
 
-2.389
(-5.80)
*** -2.382
(-5.80)
***
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.80)
*
 
-0.000
(-1.59) 
-0.000
(-1.58) 
BVS + 1.258
(3.60)
***
 
1.279
(3.65)
***
 
1.280
(3.65)
***
R-Squared   0.574 0.579 0.580
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses 
are based on firm and year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance 
at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = 
net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding 
for basic EPS (Compustat #54). DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 otherwise. DCFO5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing 
positive cash flows, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*DCFO5 = interaction indicator 
variable equals 1 if a firm reports five-year patterns both in earnings increases 
and in cash flows increases, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt 
(Compustat # 34) and long-term debt (Compustat # 9) divided by market 
capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. 
Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book 
value of equity per share. 
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Table 5  
Analysis of Market Rewards to Suspect Firms  
Panel A: Having Used Each Type of Earnings Management to Achieve the Earnings Pattern 
N=22,605   1     2     3     4 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.024
(0.94) 
1.034
(0.94) 
1.051
(0.96)
 
 
1.059
(0.97)
 
 
EPS + 5.751
(3.37)
***
 
5.736
(3.36)
***
 
5.757
(3.37)
*** 
 
5.748
(3.36)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 3.483
(4.70)
***
 
3.551
(4.59)
***
 
3.418
(4.40)
*** 
 
3.088
(3.27)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_AM_ACCR5 - -2.203
(-2.85)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_SALE5 -  -3.821
(-3.46)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_PROD5 -  -1.584
(-2.12)
** 
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_DIXP5 -  
  -0.325
(-0.33)
 
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.787
(2.45)
**
 
4.801
(2.48)
**
 
4.756
(2.42)
** 
 
4.785
(2.46)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.377
(-5.78)
*** -2.369
(-5.84)
***
 
-2.392
(-5.82)
*** 
 
-2.389
(-5.80)
***
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.58) 
-0.000
(-1.58) 
-0.000
(-1.59)
 
 
-0.000
(-1.59)
 
 
BVS + 1.279
(3.65)
***
 
1.282
(3.66)
***
 
1.279
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.279
(3.65)
***
 
R-Squared  0.579 0.580 0.579 0.579
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Having Used Multiple Types of Earnings Management to Achieve the Earnings Pattern 
N=22,605   1 2 3 4 
Variable Predicted
 Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept 
    
? 1.001
(0.91) 
1.021
(0.93) 
1.023 
(0.94) 
 
 
1.003 
(0.91) 
 
 
EPS + 5.738
(3.36)
***
 
5.758
(3.37)
***
 
5.751 
(3.37) 
*** 
 
5.742 
(3.36) 
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 4.092
(4.62)
***
 
3.864
(4.56)
***
 
3.464 
(3.54) 
*** 
 
4.491 
(3.43) 
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_AM_ACCR5 - -2.197
(-2.69)
*** -2.050
(-2.68)
***
 
-2.214 
(-3.08) 
*** 
 
-2.011 
(-2.73) 
**
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_SALE5 - -3.816
(-3.47)
***   -3.750 
(-2.98) 
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_PROD5 - -1.385
(-1.82)
*
 
  -1.008 
(-1.48) 
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_DIXP5 - 0.048 
(0.05) 
 
 
-0.330 
(-0.32) 
 
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.796
(2.47)
**
 
4.756
(2.42)
**
 
4.788 
(2.46) 
** 
 
4.6766 
(2.45) 
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.358
(-5.81)
*** -2.381
(-5.79)
***
 
-2.378 
(-5.79) 
*** 
 
-2.361 
(-5.82) 
***
 
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000 
(-1.58) 
 
 
-0.000 
(-1.57) 
 
 
BVS + 1.281
(3.66)
*** 1.279
(3.65)
***
 
1.279 
(3.65) 
*** 
 
1.282 
(3.66) 
***
 
R-Squared   0.580 0.580 0.579 0.581 
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm and 
year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). DBEAT5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 
otherwise. D_AM_ACCR5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of abnormal 
total accruals are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 
otherwise. DBEAT5*D_AM_ACCR5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings presents abnormal total accruals that, if not included in earnings, 
would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, and 0 otherwise. D_RM_SALE5 = indicator 
variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of sales management are less than previous year’s 
actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*D_RM_SALE5 = 
interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails to 
maintain the pattern when the influence of sales management is removed from earnings, and 0 
otherwise. D_RM_PROD5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of 
production management are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five 
years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*D_RM_PROD5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of 
production management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. D_RM_DIXP5 = indicator 
variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of expenses management are less than previous 
year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*D_RM_DIXP5 
= interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails 
to maintain the pattern when the influence of discretionary expense management is removed from 
earnings, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt 
(Compustat #9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage 
change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book 
value of equity per share. 
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Table 6  
Analysis of Market Rewards to Non-Suspect Beaters and Suspect Firms 
N=22,605   1 2 3 4 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.018
(0.93) 
1.029
(0.94) 
1.043
(0.95)
 
 
1.050
(0.96)
 
 
EPS + 5.757
(3.37)
***
 
5.744
(3.36)
***
 
5.763
(3.37)
*** 
 
5.755
(3.37)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 2.923
(4.03)
**
 
3.011
(4.12)
***
 
2.836
(3.77)
*** 
 
2.601
(2.85)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*DCFO5 + 3.567
(2.61)
***
 
3.114
(2.44)
**
 
3.570
(2.66)
** 
 
3.728
(2.73)
**
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_AM_ACCR5 - -2.050
(-2.66)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_SALE5 -  -3.298
(-3.16)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_PROD5 -   -1.389(-1.83)
* 
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_RM_DIXP5 -  
   -0.455
(-0.45)
 
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.738
(2.40)
**
 
4.757
(2.43)
**
 
4.711
(2.37)
** 
 
4.731
(2.40)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.371
(-5.78)
*** -2.366
(-5.84)
***
 
-2.385
(-5.81)
*** 
 
-2.381
(-5.80)
***
 
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.58)
 
 
-0.00
(-1.58)
 
 
BVS + 1.280
(3.65)
***
 
1.282
(3.66)
***
 
1.280
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.280
(3.65)
***
 
R-Squared  0.580 0.580 0.580 0.580
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm 
and year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). 
DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive 
earnings, and 0 otherwise. DCFO5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of 
increasing positive cash flows, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*DCFO5 = interaction indicator variable 
equals 1 if a firm reports five-year patterns both in earnings increases and in cash flows increases, 
and 0 otherwise. D_AM_ACCR5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of 
abnormal total accruals are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five 
years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*D_AM_ACCR5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings presents abnormal total accruals that, if not included 
in earnings, would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, and 0 otherwise. D_RM_SALE5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of sales management are less than 
previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT5*D_RM_SALE5= interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern 
of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of sales management is 
removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. D_RM_PROD5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings 
without the influence of production management are less than previous year’s actual earnings during 
any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*D_RM_PROD5 = interaction indicator 
variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern 
when the influence of production management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
D_RM_DIXP5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of expenses 
management are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 
otherwise. DBEAT5*D_RM_DIXP5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of discretionary 
expense management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
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Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat #9) divided 
by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. 
Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per 
shares. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Market Rewards to Firms with a Pattern of Increasing Earnings Not 
Achieved through Sales Growth 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Num. of 
Years 
Num. of  
Total Observations 
Num. of  
Earnings Beaters
Num. of Suspect Firms   
(% over Earnings Beaters) 
5 22605 2088 398 (0.19) 
Panel B: Regression Results 
N=22,605    
Variable Predicted 
 Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept 
    
? 1.058
(0.97) 
EPS + 5.753
(3.37)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 3.350
(4.73)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*D_NONREV5 - -2.70
(-3.80)
***
EPS*Growth5 + 4.729
(2.38)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.383
(-5.81)
***
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.58) 
BVS + 1.280
(3.66)
***
R-Squared   0.580
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based 
on firm and year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% 
(two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income 
before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS 
(Compustat #54). DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern 
of increasing positive earnings, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*D_NONREV5 = interaction 
indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a five-year pattern in earnings increases but 
not sales growth, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) 
and long-term debt (Compustat #9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of 
the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth 
rate of book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Appendix  
Variable Descriptions and Definitions 
PRICE Close price – fiscal year end (#199) 
Earnings NIBE, net income before extraordinary items (#18) 
EPS net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares 
outstanding for basic EPS ( #54) 
DBEAT5 An indicator variable equals to 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of 
increasing positive earnings, and 0 otherwise 
CFO Cash flow from operations (#308) 
DCFO5 An indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of 
increasing cash flows, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*DCFO5 An interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports 5-year 
patterns both in earnings increases and in cash flows increases, and 0 
otherwise 
A Total assets (#6) 
Total Accruals the difference between net income before extraordinary items (#18) and 
cash flows from operations (#308) divided by lagged total assets (#6) 
PPE Firm’s gross property, plant, and equipment, COMPUSTAT #7 
Ab_TA the level of abnormal total accruals computed using the Jones Model 
D_AM_ACCR5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without discretionary 
accruals (abnormal total accruals multiplied by lagged total assets) are 
less than previous year’s actual earnings during any of the five years, 
and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*D_AM_ACCR5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings presents discretionary total accruals 
that, if not included in earnings, would fail to report the pattern of 
increasing earnings, and 0 otherwise 
Sales Net sales ( #12) 
Ab_CFO the level of abnormal cash flows from operations computed using 
equation (3) 
D_RM_SALES5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without sales 
management (abnormal CFO multiplied by lagged total assets) are less 
than previous year’s actual earnings during any of the five years, and 0 
otherwise 
DBEAT5*D_RM_SALE5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when 
the influence of sales management is not included in earnings, and 0 
otherwise 
COG Cost of goods sold (#41) 
INVT Inventory (#3) 
PROD Production cost = COGS (#41) + INVT (#3) 
Ab_PROD the level of abnormal production costs computed using equation (4) 
D_RM_PROD5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without production 
management (abnormal production costs multiplied by total assets) are 
less than previous year’s actual earnings during any of the five years, 
and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*D_RM_PROD5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when 
production management is not included in earnings, and 0 otherwise 
R&D R&D expenses (#46) 
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses (#189) 
Advertising Advertising expenses (#45) 
Discretionary Expenses  R&D (#46) + SGA (#189) + Advertising (#45)  
Ab_DIXP the level of abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D_RM_ADIXP5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without the influence 
of expenses management (abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied 
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by total assets) are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any 
consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*D_RM_DIXP5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when 
the influence of discretionary expense management is not included in 
earnings, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*D_NONREV5 An interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings but not a five-year pattern of increasing 
sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Leverage The sum of short-term debt (#34) and long-term debt (#9) divided by 
market capitalization(#199*#25) 
Evar Variance of the past five years’ percentage change in earnings 
ሺNIBE୧,୲ െ NIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ/absሺNIBE୧,୲ିଵ) 
Growth5 Five-year compound annual growth rate of book value of equity (#60), 
(BVt/BVt-6)1/5-1 
BVS Book value of equity per share (#60/# 54). 
 
All variables are in millions of dollars except number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS 
(#54), which units are millions. 
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